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TRUSTS-POWER OF SETTLOR-SOLE BENEFICIARY TO
TERMINATE AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST-Johnson v. First
National Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d 1112 (Miss. 1980).
In 1976 Mary Moore Johnson, a 25 year old single woman, made an
irrevocable' trust agreement with First National Bank of Jackson. The
trust was to include a substantial inheritance she was due to receive
from her father's estate.' In 1978 she sought to revoke the trust agree-
ment, alleging she was the settlor and sole beneficiary, was sui juris,
and under no incapacity.'
Trial testimony revealed she had established the trust on advice
from her mother and the family accountant because she realized she
lacked the ability to manage the large amount of money she was about
to receive. Evidence was presented that she had made numerous and
excessive demands for advances from the corpus of the trust and had
poorly managed funds she received. Much attention was focused on
her contributions of $30,000 to the Church of Scientology and the
church's influence on her. Ms. Johnson testified that she was presently
more responsible and able to handle her affairs", but she also admitted
that if the trust were revoked, she planned to spend $57,648 on Scien-
tology training.'
The chancellor dismissed Johnson's bill after finding the trust was
irrevocable and termination would not serve Ms. Johnson's best inter-
est." On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered three main
issues: whether the settlor-sole beneficiary could terminate an irrevoca-
ble trust; whether there were any reasons for not following the general
rule which would permit termination; and whether there was any rea-
son in the instant case for allowing termination. Since this was a case
of first impression in Mississippi, the court examined the case law that
had developed in other jurisdictions in regard to this problem. The
court adopted as a general rule for Mississippi, the majority rule of
trust law, which allows a settlor-sole beneficiary to revoke an irrevoca-
ble trust at any time.7 It was the court's view that under this general
'Paragraph 6 of the trust agreement read "This trust is absolute and irrevocable. The
Trustor expressly declares that she shall have no power to amend, alter, or modify this
trust agreement." Record, vol. 1, at 10, Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So.
2d 1112 (Miss. 1980).
'Ms. Johnson was to receive the income for life and upon her death the corpus and
undistributed income were to go to her estate. The trustee had the right and sole discre-
tion to invade the corpus to meet the reasonable needs of the trustor. Record, vol. 1, at 8,
Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d 1112 (Miss. 1980).
'386 So. 2d at 1113 (Miss. 1980).
4id.
'Brief for Appellee at 4, Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d 1112 (Miss.
1980).
'386 So. 2d at 1113 (Miss. 1980).
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rule, unless Ms. Johnson had been declared legally incompetent, which
had not been done, she could revoke the trust. The chancellor's deci-
sion was reversed and revocation of the trust was permitted.'
TRUST TERMINATION
Since the 1930's the area of termination has increased in importance
in trust law due to the Great Depression and a decrease in productivity
of trust estates.9 As fluctuations continue to occur in the economy, set-
tlors and beneficiaries will continue to seek the help of the courts to
obtain relief from unproductive or oppressive trusts or to obtain access
to the trust corpus in order to meet increased financial needs. The
brief survey of the general law regarding termination which follows, is
necessary in order to view the instant case in its proper perspective.
As a general rule once a trust has been created, it is considered to
be irrevocable, unless the settlor expressly reserved the power to re-
voke.10 Contrary to the common law, a few states provide by statute
that a trust is revocable unless it is expressly made irrevocable." Where
the power of revocation has been reserved, the settlor can revoke the
trust only in the manner and to the extent to which such power has
been reserved. 2
Usually a trust instrument expressly provides the time for the termi-
nation of a trust, and it will not be terminated prior to that time.1"
Early termination may occur, however, as a result of various circum-
stances. The same reasons which allow rescission of contracts are appli-
cable to trusts. Fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake of fact and
incapacity are grounds to rescind a trust. 4 If the trust purpose is ac-
Sld. at 1115.
'LeFever, Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania, 96 U. PENN. L. REV. 305 (1948).
"See Watkins v. Watkins, 64 Ga. App. 344, 13 S.E.2d 100 (1941); Mortimer v. Mor-
timer, 6 III. App. 3d 217, 285 N.E.2d 542 (1972); Viney v. Abbot, 109 Mass. 300 (1872);
Anderson v. Love, 169 Miss. 219, 151 So. 366 (1934) modified 169 Miss. 219, 153 So. 369
(1934); Nelson v. Ratliff, 72 Miss. 656, 18 So. 487 (1895); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 330 (1957); IV A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 330.1 (3d ed. 1967).
"See CAL CIV. CODE § 2280 (West 1954) (applies to voluntary trusts created after
Aug. 13, 1931); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (West 1930) (not limited to volun-
tary trusts); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425-41 (Vernon 1925) (every trust revoca-
ble by settlor in lifetime, unless expressly made irrevocable).
"See Downs v. Security Trust Co., 175 Ky. 789, 194 S.W. 1041 (1917); McClendon v.
First Natl Bank, 299 So. 2d 407 (La. 1974); Hiserodt v. Hamlett, 74 Miss 37, 20 So. 143
(1896); Billingslea v. Young, 33 Miss. 95 (1857); In Matter of Mordecai, 24 Misc. 2d 668,
201 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1960); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 330, comment j.; BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1000.
"IV A. SCOTr, supra note 10, § 329A.
"Committee on Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, Early Termina-
tion of Trusts, 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 303 (1967).
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complished,1 impossible of accomplishment,"' illegal, 7 or against pub-
lic policy"8 the result will be early termination.
Trusts are sometimes terminated due to the application of the doc-
trine of merger. If subsequent to the creation of a trust, one person
becomes the owner of the legal interest and the entire beneficial inter-
est, the equitable interest and the legal interest are merged and the
trust terminates. There is also considered to be a merger of the equita-
ble life interest and the equitable remainder interest when one person
is both life beneficiary and the beneficiary entitled to the remainder
interest.' Merger does not automatically terminate the trust, but ter-
mination is usually permitted unless ending the trust would prevent
the accomplishment of a material purpose of the trust or would be
inequitable.2'
"See Pillow v. Wade, 31 Ark. 678 (1877); Coughlin v. Seago, 53 Ga. 250 (1874); In ReCornils Estate, 167 Iowa 196, 149 N.W. 65 (1914) (trust for daughter's benefit which
was created to protect her estate from her husband, and was to last for her husband's
lifetime, was terminated when she obtained a divorce); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.
v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S.W. 537 (1925) (where trust created to protect settlor who
suffered from epilepsy was terminated when he apparently regained his health); BO-
GERT, supra note 12 § 1992.
"See Black v. Bail, 142 Ark. 201, 218 S.W. 210 (1920) (allowing termination where it
was impossible to make property which was the subject of the trust income producing);
Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966) (trust for segregated park termi-
nated when impossible of accomplishment due to United States Supreme Court decision
that segregation could not be authorized under the U.S. Constitution): Brunswich v.
Stewart, 215 Ga. 141, 109 S.E.2d 606 (1959) (where a will established a trust for niece
and nephew until the youngest reached 21 but both were over 21 when testatrix died
there was considered to be no trust); Ryan Estate, 404 Pa. 229, 172 A.2d 584 (1961);
Fisher v. Harrison, 165 Va. 322, 182 S.E. 543 (1935); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §
335; BOGERT. supra note 12, § 1002.
"See In re Morse, 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374 (1928) (trust legal when created, but
subsequent statute made it illegal).
"See Graves v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1965) (a trust which provided
as a condition precedent to receiving trust funds that the niece divorce her husband and
terminate cohabitation with him was declared void), Id. In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 284
Pa. 11, 130 A. 238 (1925); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 335, comment d; BOGERT,
supra note 12 § 1002.
"See Atkins v. Atkins, 279 Mass. 1, 180 N.E. 613 (1932); Cunningham v. Bright, 228
Mass. 385, 117 N.E. 909 (1917); Healey v. Alston, 25 Miss. 190 (1852) (merger of legal
and equitable interests); Citizen's Natl Bank v. Longshore, 304 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1974);
BOGERT, supra note 12, § 1003; IV A. SCOTT, supra note 10, §§ 337.1, 341.
"Whenever it would work an injustice or defeat the intention of the donor, to work a
merger, the two estates will be kept alive although they come together in one person."
In re Estate of Washburn, 11 Cal. App. 735, 106 P. 415, 420 (1910). See also (held to be
merger) Dare v. New Brunswick Trust Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 349, 194 A. 61 (1937); Gillogly
v. Campbell, 52 Ohio App. 43, 2 N.E.2d 620 (1935); Nichols v. First Natl Bank, 199 Or.
659, 264 P.2d 451 (1953); In re Fitton's Will, 218 Wis. 63, 259 N.W. 718 (1935); Contra,
(merger not applied) Trabits v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 345 So. 2d 1347 (Ala. 1977);
Bowlin v. Citizens' Bank and Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S.W. 288 (1917); Wechter v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 385 III. 311, 52 N.E.2d 157 (1944).
1981]
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I. Beneficiaries Lacking Settlor's Consent to Terminate
If the beneficiaries attempt to revoke the trust without the consent
of the settlor, the result depends on whether the court follows the ma-
jority or minority rule. This situation arises most often when it is im-
possible to obtain the settlor's consent because the settlor is dead.
American Rule
According to the American majority rule, termination without the
settlor's consent is allowed if all the beneficiaries are competent, give
their consent, and continuance is not necessary to fulfill a material
purpose for which the trust was created."' Great importance is at-
tached to the lack of material purpose requirement. Even though all
the beneficiaries consent and none are under an incapacity, termina-
tion will be denied when it is necessary to continue the trust to carry
out a material purpose.2
This rule, often referred to as the Claflin doctrine, resulted from
the decision in Claflin v. Claflin.23 According to the terms of the Cla-
flin trust, the settlor's son was to receive $10,000 at the age of 21,
$10,000 at the age of 25, and the corpus of the trust at age 30. When
the son reached 21, he sought to receive the entire amount in the trust.
In refusing to allow termination, the court stressed the right of the
settlor to restrict his gift according to his desires and judgment. The
rationale for refusing termination focused on the court's function in
carrying out the settlor's intent where it was not against public policy
to do so. Although there were no spendthrift provisions in the trust, the
court appeared to compare the postponement of payment clause to a
spendthrift clause. They seemed to view both clauses as the same type
and felt both should be upheld in order to achieve the settlor's intent.
24
Spendthrift Trusts
Spendthrift trusts contain provisions which restrict a beneficiary's
interest so that it is not assignable by him, nor can it be reached by his
creditors.'5 Spendthrift provisions impose a limitation on the consent
"
1See Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951);
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Meridian v. Longshore, 304 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1974); Ampere
Bank & Trust Co. v. Esterly, 139 N.J. Eq. 33, 49 A.2d 769 (1946); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, § 337; BOGERT, supra note 12, § 1007.
'See Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90 (1913); Clemenson v. Rebsamen, 205 Ark. 123, 168
S.W.2d 195 (1943); Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932); Downs v. Securi-
ty Trust Co., 175 Ky. 789, 194 S.W. 1041 (1917); Ray v. Kelly, 82 Miss. 597, 35 So. 165
(1903); Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380 (1933); In re
Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 A. 58 (1924); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 337.
'149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
UId. at 23, 20 N.E at 456. "It is true that the plaintiff's interest is alienable by him,
and can be taken by his creditors to pay his debts, but it does not follow that because the
testator had not imposed all possible restrictions, the restrictions which he has imposed
should not be carried into effect." Id.
'II A. SCOTT, supra note 10, § 151.
[Vol. 2:143
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exception and generally prevent termination altogether.26 When con-
sidering a question of termination, spendthrift trusts are considered as
having a material purpose which has not been accomplished. If revo-
cation were allowed it would lessen the protection the restraints on
alienation provide the beneficiary, because as soon as he received the
property it would become subject to his assignments and could be
reached by his creditors."
Minority Rule
The English or minority rule allows revocation when all the benefi-
ciaries are ascertained and give their consent even though there are
purposes unfulfilled.' This exception is based upon the rationale that
there being no one else who has any interest in the property, there is
no reason to deny termination.2" In Ambrose v. First National Bank of
Nevada" where facts were similar to Claflin, the court refused to ap-
ply the Claflin doctrine and ordered termination of the trust. The inter
vivos trust had been created by the beneficiary's mother to prevent the
settlor from squandering her assets. The trust was to continue after the
mother's death and was to be distributed to the daughter as she
reached certain ages. The daughter was permitted to terminate the
trust after her mother's death, but prior to reaching the first specified
age. 1 Merit can be found in an argument in favor of the minority
position. If it is not a spendthrift trust and the court denies termina-
tion, beneficiaries can sell their interests, thus indirectly getting to the
principal. They would usually have to sell at a discount but they could
evade the inflexibility of the majority rule. Thus, one may question
whether a rule which can be evaded and causes a loss to the beneficia-
ries is a rule which should continue to be enforced.1
2
II. Beneficiaries with Settlor's Consent to Terminate
If the beneficiaries and the settlor consent and all of the beneficia-
ries are legally competent, the trust will be terminated even though
"See Clemenson v. Rebsamen, 205 Ark. 123, 168, S.W. 2d, 195 (1943); Moore v. Sin-
nott, 117 Ga. 1010, 44 S.E. 810 (1903); Maher v. Maher, 207 Ky. 360, 269 S.W. 287
(1924); Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn. 517, 226 S.W. 1039 (1920); E. GRISWOLD, SPEND-
THRIFT TRUSTS § 511, 517 (1936); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 337.
"GRISWOLD, supra note 26, § 511.
"See Crumlish v. Delaware Trust Co., 29 Del. Ch. 503, 46 A.2d 888 (1946); Dodge v.
Dodge, 112 Me. 291, 92 A. 49 (1914) (where a trust was created to insure beneficiaries
against want in sickness and old age. Purpose would not be accomplished until all bene-
ficiaries were dead but termination was allowed prior to that time); Spooner v. Dunalp,
87 N.H. 384, 180 A. 256 (1935); Newlin v. Girard Tr. Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 498, 174 A. 479
(1934); Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N.J. Eq. 125, 23 A. 495 (1892); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, § 337. BOGERT, supra note 12, § 1008.
"IV A. SCOIr, supra note 10, § 337.
'87 Nev. 114, 482 P.2d 828 (1971).
"I/d. at 120, 482 P.2d at 831.
"BOGERT, supra note 12, § 1008.
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there are still purposes unaccomplished.83 Even spendthrift trusts may
be terminated with the consent of the settlor and all of the beneficia-
ries.14 The rationale for the consent doctrine, which allows termination
under these circumstances, is that there is no reason for continuing the
trust if all the beneficially interested parties desire termination.' Some
states statutorily recognize this right to termination. 6 The primary
problem for the courts resulting from this rule is determining who all
of the beneficiaries are.
III. Settlor-Sole Beneficiary
It is logical, in view of the consent doctrine, that a settlor who is
also the sole beneficiary and under no legal incapacity could terminate
a trust at any time, even if the original purpose of the trust has not
been accomplished"7 and the trust instrument expressly states it is ir-
revocable." This is the majority rule of trust law. 9 Under the majority
"See Heifetz v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 776, 305
P.2d 979 (1957); Dunnett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 184 Okla. 2, 85 P.2d 281
(1938); Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 515 (1943); Fowler v. Lanpher, 193
Wash. 308, 75 P.2d 132 (1938); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 338; BOGERT supra
note 12, § 1005.
"See Botzum v. Havana Nat'l Bank, 367 Ill. 539, 12 N.E.2d. 203 (1937); IV A.
SCOTT, supra note 10, § 338; GRISWOLD, supra note 26, § 528.
"IV A. SCOTT, supra note 10, § 338.
"See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-23-502 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 771 (West Supp.
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §59-02-18 (1959); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 55-3-6 (1967);
WIS. STAT. § 701.12 (West 1957).
""Since no one but the settlor has any beneficial interest in the trust, if he is not
under a legal disability, he should be permitted to do with it as he wills, regardless of
the prudence of its creation." Manice v. Howard Say. Inst., 30 N.J. Super. 267, 270, 104
A.2d 74, 75 (1954). See also Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 11. 592, 1 N.E.2d 59 (1936).
'See Stewart v. Merchants Natl Bank of Aurora, 3 Ill. App 3d 327, 278 N.E.2d 10
(1972) (termination was permitted even though the trust was expressly irrevocable due
to a clause in the trust instrument in addition to having unaccomplished purposes). See
also Weymouth v. Delaware Trust Co., 29 Del. Ch. 1, 45 A.2d 427 (1946) (termination
permitted even though irrevocable clause in trust instrument).
"See Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949); Weymouth
v. Delaware Trust Co., 29 Del. Ch. 1, 45 A.2d 603 (1946); H.M. Byllesby & Co. v.
Doriot, 25 Del. Ch. 46, 12 A.2d 603 (1940); Woodruff v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 210 S.E.
2d 321 (Ga. 1974); Moore v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ga. 798, 130 S.E.2d 718
(1963); Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Aurora, 3 IMI. App. 3d 327, 278 N.E.2d 10
(1972); Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 I11. 593, 1 N.E.2d 59 (1936); Baffel v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 100 Md. 141, 59 A. 702 (1905); Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 477, 58 A. 28 (1904);
Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923); Cole v. Nickel, 43 Nev. 12, 177 P.
409 (1919); Manice v. Howard Say. Inst., 30 N.J. Super 267, 104 A.2d 74 (1954); Doyle
v. Bank of Montclair, 9 N.J. Super. 586, 76 A.2d 41 (1950); Sack v. Chemical Bank &
Trust Co., 54 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1945); Schellentrager v. Tradesmans Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952); Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 519 (1943);
Waldron v. Commerce Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1978); O'Brien v. Holden,
104 Vt. 338, 160 A. 192 (1932); Bottimore v. First & Merchants Natl Bank, 170 Va. 221,




rule the settlor-sole beneficiary can terminate the trust even if the
original purpose in creating the trust was to prevent himself from mis-
managing his property."0
Brillhart v. Mish41 is a good example of the rationale for allowing
revocation. In that instance the life tenant of six parcels of real estate
had put his interests in trust for his own benefit due to his health.
Later the remaindermen, with the settlor's consent, petitioned for par-
tition but the trustee objected. The court held that legal control of the
trustee was equivalent to a revocable power to manage and control
property. Since this power was not coupled with an interest in the
property, it was interpreted to be revocable at will in spite of any pro-
visions against revocability."
It has also been held that the relationship between the settlor and
the trustee does not create a contractual obligation. Therefore the
trustee does not acquire an interest in the fees he would receive for
administering the trust which would allow him to prevent termination.
A trust will not be continued soley for the trustee's benefit, and he
does not have any interest that will deny revocation.4
The fact situation faced by the court for the first time in Johnson v.
First National Bank of Jackson" had confronted the Georgia Supreme
Court twice in the past two decades. One of the Georgia cases, Moore
v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,' involved an irrevocable trust,
while the most recent case, Woodruff v. Trust Co. of Georgia,"" in-
volved a trust which was revocable only with the trustee's consent.
Both cases ultimately resulted in a holding allowing revocation.
In Moore the court relied on the idea that since the settlor was the
only one interested in the property, she had a right to retake and man-
age her own property." Since she had the right to terminate the trust,
she had a right to revoke the clause that made it irrevocable." The
court stated in Woodruff that the settlor-sole beneficiary's right to ter-
minate is not derived from the terms of the trust, but is an inherent
right that exists outside of the trust agreement. It was reasoned that
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 339.
199 Md. 447, 58 A. 28 (1904).
"fId. at 456-57, 58 A. at 31 (1904).
U'The fact that the trustee is entitled to additional commission by the continuance of
the trust is not sufficient grounds to deny termination." Bower's Trust Estate, 346 Pa. at
87, 29 A.2d at 520 (1943). See also Moore v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ga. 798,
130 S.E.2d 718; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 337, comment b; IV A. SCOTT', supra
note 10, § 338.
"386 So. 2d 1112 (Miss. 1980).
"218 Ga. 798, 130 S.E.2d 718 (1963).
'210 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1974).
'218 Ga. at 802, 130 S.E.2d at 721.
"Id. at 802-3, 130 S.E.2d at 721-22.
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this right existed because no one else had any interest in the trust.' 9
The court relied on the earlier Moore decision and concluded that be-
cause the settlor had a right to terminate the trust, she also had a right
to eliminate the limitation requiring the trustee's consent. The court's
view was that the terms of a trust instrument in regard to consent and
revocation are immaterial when the settlor is the sole beneficiary."
Waldron v. Commerce Union Bank,5 a recent Tennessee case, il-
lustrates the fact that settlor-sole beneficiary who is under no incapac-
ity is entitled to terminate a trust. This is true even if it was estab-
lished for protection from the beneficiary's own financial irresponsibil-
ity, unfulfilled purposes remain, and termination would not be in the
settlor's best interest. The settlor in Waldron, Mrs. Peay, was an alco-
holic who had created a trust to protect her from squandering her
assets. Mrs. Peay transferred large sums of money to her checking ac-
count from her trust. After her daughters were appointed her conser-
vators, they sued to collect the money transferred. Relying on RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 339 (1957), the court held
that since Mrs. Peay was not under any incapacity when the money
was transferred, as sole beneficiary she could revoke or modify the
trust, so the transfers were permissible."
The consequence of a spendthrift provision in a trust when a set-
tlor-sole beneficiary attempts to revoke the trust was also discussed in
Waldron." The court emphasized that a settlor cannot create a spend-
thrift trust for his own benefit. Regardless of the provision, in such
circumstances the settlor's interest can be reached by his creditors and
may be subject to assignment.5 It has been held to be against public
policy to allow a person to deal with his property in such a way that
he retains the enjoyment of the property, but creditors are prevented
from reaching it.55 If creation of such a trust is attempted, the spend-
thrift clause will be held void in regard to the settlor's creditors. His
interest is alienable, but the trust will be valid with respect to all other
parties. This was the position taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court
in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Walter E. Heller Co.5 in
which a creditor filed suit to collect a judgment against the adminis-
trator of the settlor's estate. The trust in that case provided that the
settlor was to receive the income from the principal for his lifetime,
"210 S.E.2d at 323-24.
Old. at 324.
"577 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. App. 1978) (cert. denied, Feb. 26, 1979).
uld. at 673-74.
"Id. at 674.
mid. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 339, comment a. (Quoted by the
court in Waldron); I A. SCOTT, supra note 10, at 156.
"IV A. SCOTT, supra note 10, at § 156.
"204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
[Vol. 2:143
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then upon his death the trust was to terminate and the principal was to
be distributed to a nephew. The settlor retained the right to withdraw
from the principal of the trust up to twenty-five percent per year of
the fair market value of the trust estate. The trust instrument also con-
tained a provision protecting the trust from creditors. 7 After execution
and recordation of the trust, the settlor borrowed money listing the
trust funds as an asset. Upon application of the creditor the trust estate
was held liable for payment of the judgment. This resulted from the
court's view that a debtor should not have funds available to him and
yet be able to keep creditors from reaching those funds." This decision
recognized the validity of spendthrift trusts in Mississippi, but restrict-
ed these trusts to those created for one other than a settlor-sole benefi-
ciary.59
Determination if Settlor is Sole Beneficiary
Most of the litigation in the settlor-sole beneficiary area concerns
the determination of whether the settlor is in fact the sole beneficiary,
or if he has created an interest for anyone else. In certain circum-
stances it is very clear that the settlor is the sole beneficiary. One ex-
ample of this situation arises when the settlor provides for the income
to be paid to him for a set term with the principal to be returned to
him at the expiration of the term. Another situation arises when the
income is to be paid to the settlor for life and the principal is to be
distributed to his estate or his personal representatives. A third is when
the income is to be paid to the settlor for life with no provisions for the
distribution of the principal upon his death because the trustee will
hold upon a resulting trust for the settlor or his estate."0
It is sometimes obvious when the settlor is not the sole beneficiary.
An example of this circumstance arises when the settlor is to receive
the income for life and the principal is to be distributed to his chil-
dren, issue, or descendants. He has created a remainder interest and is
therefore not the sole beneficiary. 1
Often the settlor creates a trust which pays the income to him for
life and on his death conveys the trust property to his heirs or next of
kin. This situation raises the question of whether the settlor has a life
interest with an interest in remainder given to people who become his
heirs, or whether the settlor has a life interest plus a reversionary inter-
est so that he is the sole beneficiary of the trust. 2 Some courts rely on
""The trust shall not be subject to attachment or garnishment or execution by reason
of any debt or other obligation of Grantor." Id. at 858.
mid. at 862.
"Jones, Spendthrift Trusts in Mississippi, 1 MISS. C.L. REV. 135, 153 (1979).
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the Doctrine of Worthier Title to answer this question. This doctrine
holds that a disposition in favor of the heirs of the settlor creates a
reversion in the settlor and not a remainder in his heirs. This old com-
mon law rule is treated as a rule of construction in the United States
today." The settlor's intent is the key factor, and there is an inference
that the settlor does not intend to create an interest in his heirs unless a
clear contrary intention is stated." The results of the application of this
doctrine to a trust is that the settlor is made the sole beneficiary. Doc-
tor v. Hughes" is a good illustration of the application of this doctrine.
The settlor had created a trust reserving the income to himself with
distribution to his heirs at law upon his death. While the settlor was
living, a judgment creditor brought suit to reach the settlor's daugh-
ter's interest in the trust. Judge Cardozo held that the daughter had no
interest at that time which could be attached."
The trend in recent cases has been to rely on RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 127 (1957). This section provides defini-
tions of the situations in which the settlor will be considered the sole
beneficiary. 7
Best Interest Doctrine
There is a minority view in regard to settlor-sole beneficiaries
which refuses to allow the settlor-sole beneficiary to revoke the trust if
the court finds termination would not be in the best interest of the
settlor.
Kentucky exemplifies a state which adheres to the minority rule.
Case law of that state holds that if a settlor-sole beneficiary creates a
trust to protect himself from his own bad habits, he cannot terminate
"II A. SCOTT, supra note 10, at § 127.1. The Doctrine of Worthier Title does survive
as a rule of construction in Mississippi. See West Tennessee Co. v. Towns, 52 F.2d 764
(N.D. Miss. 1931); Williams V. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39 (1929); Boone v. Baird,
91 Miss. 420, 44 So. 929 (1907); Harris v. McLarun, 30 Miss. 533 (1855).
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 127.
-225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
"Id. at 312, 122 N.E. at 221. He stated "But at least the ancient rule survives to this
extent: That to transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the
intention to work the transformation must be clearly expressed. Here there is no clear
expression of such purpose." Id. at 312, 122 N.E. 222.
"See Woodruff v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 210 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. 1974) "Where the
owner of property, whether real or personal, transfers it in trust to pay the income to
himself for a period of years and at the expiraton of the period to pay the principal to
him, he is the sole beneficiary of the trust. He is likewise the sole beneficiary where he
transfers property in trust to pay the income to himself for life and on his death to pay
the principal to his estate, or to his personal representatives. So also, he is the sole benefi-
ciary where he transfers property in trust to pay the income to himself for life with no
provision as to the disposition of the property on his death, since the trustee will hold
upon a resulting trust for him or his estate, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
intention." RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 127, comment b.
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it so long as the habits exist." Downs v. Security Trust Co. 9 is perhaps
the best illustration of the principle. Downs, suffering from drunkeness
and deeply in debt, created a trust for his support to prevent his estate
from being squandered. He later attempted to revoke the trust. Since
Downs was still an alcoholic at the time of attempted revocation, the
court found the objects of the trust unsatisfied and denied revocation."0
There are, however, some Kentucky cases which allow termination if
the purpose for creating the trust is fully accomplished, and the settlor
would benefit from revocation. In Kentucky it appears that in order
for the settlor-sole beneficiary to terminate a trust, three requirements
must be met. In addition to the consent of all beneficially interested
parties, the whole object of the trust must have been accomplished,
and the termination must be to the beneficiary's advantage. 1 The
Kentucky courts seem to view each case on its particular facts and
then rule according to what is felt would be most beneficial to the
settlor.
Although Kentucky appears to adhere to the minority or best inter-
est rule, Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn" is often cited in
support of the majority rule, which allows termination because the set-
tlor is also the sole beneficiary. This appears, however, to be the result
of an apparent misreading of the case. Gwynn had created a trust for
himself because he had epilepsy. When he no longer suffered epileptic
seizures, he tried to revoke the trust. The court allowed revocation
since it was felt that the purpose of the trust had been fulfilled. How-
ever, the court specifically refused to rule on the settlor-sole beneficia-
ry question."' Therefore, though the court allowed revocation it in no
way adopted the principles of the majority rule.
Until 1943 Pennsylvania, like Kentucky, followed the minority rule
on the subject of revocation by a settlor-sole beneficiary. If the settlor-
sole beneficiary created the trust for his own protection from his bad
habits, termination was not permitted." In Reidy v. Small" a trust cre-
aSee Downs v. Security Trust Co., 175 Ky. 789, 194 S.W. 1041 (1917); Coleman v.
Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co., 28 Ky. 1263, 91 S.W. 716 (1906).
"175 Ky. 789, 194 S.W. 1041 (1917).
"Id. at 797, 194 S.W. at 1044.
"See Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W.2d 814 (1937);
Haldeman's Trustee v. Haldeman, 239 Ky. 717, 40 S.W.2d 348 (1931).
7206 Ky. 823, 268 S.W. 537 (1925).
""However, as the question is presented by this appeal, it seems unnecessary to deter-
mine it. Appellant has under the other rule been granted all necessary relief. Its decision
would be only to settle an abstract question of law." (The other rule referred to is the
accomplishment of purpose doctrine.) Id. at 827, 268 S.W. at 539.
"Long v. Tradesmen Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 363, 165 A. 56
(1933).
154 Pa. 505, 26 A. 602 (1893). "But a trust created by an old man in a lucid interval,
in terror of impending hereditary insanity, all the more probable because of vicious
personal habits, from its very purpose should be irrevocable." Id. at 515, 26 A. at 604.
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ated by an aged man fearing hereditary insanity was held to be irrevo-
cable even though he was the sole beneficiary. The "best interest" ra-
tionale was applied to deny a mentally weak, but legally competent,
settlor-sole beneficiary the power to terminate the trust in Neal v.
Black.7" The rationale of the minority rule was also applied by the
Pennsylvania courts to situations involving a settlor-sole beneficiary
with a spendthrift trust. As with past holdings, revocation was denied."
Since a spendthrift trust cannot be created by a settlor for himself, the
courts must have meant that if the settlor's interest is not alienable or
cannot be reached by his creditors, termination will be denied even
though the spendthrift provisions are invalid."8 In Rehr v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co.71 the court refused to look at the settlor-sole
beneficiary issue since there were spendthrift provisions in the trust.
The court neglected to notice authority that a settlor cannot create a
spendthrift trust for himself.8
Bowers' Trust Estate"1 changed Pennsylvania trust law. In Bowers a
woman who had set up a spendthrift trust for the benefit of herself
and her son was allowed to revoke the trust after she obtained full
interest in the trust benefits through assignment of the son's interest. In
this decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rule of RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 339 (1935) which permits
termination of a trust when the settlor is the sole beneficiary. 2 Prior
Pennsylvania decisions, as previously reviewed, had denied termina-
tion if the trust was created to protect the settlor from himself or was a
spendthrift trust thus qualifying allowance of termination." In this de-
cision the court recognized a distinction it had ignored in the earlier
line of cases. In the prior decisions the difference between a testamen-
tary trust, where no consent for termination could be obtained and the
inter vivos trust, where the settlor could consent, had not been no-
ticed."' Upon making the distinction, the court recognized since it was
their function to see that the wishes of the settlor were followed, it
71177 Pa. 83, 35 A. 561 (1896). See 177 Pa. at 101-105, 35 A. at 568-69 for discussion
of previous line of cases establishing principles by which this case was determined.
"See Long v. Tradesmens Nati Bank & Trust Co., 108 Pa. Super Ct. 363, 165 A. 56
(1933); Appeal of Merriman, 134 Pa. 114, 19 A. 479 (1890).
"IV A. SCOTT, supra note 10, § 339.
'310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380. (1933).
'"See Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 A. 52 (1907). See also Manice v. Howard Say.
Inst. 30 N.J. Super. 267, 104 A.2d 74 (1954); GRISWOLD, supra note 26, § 474; RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 10, § 156 for authority subsequent to the Rehr decision.
81346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943).
nId. at 86, 29 A.2d at 520.
"See 91 U. PENN. L. REV. 672, 673 n.4 (1943).
u346 Pa. at 86, 29 A.2d at 520.
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would not be proper to restrict living settlor-sole beneficiaries from
revoking a trust.85
Pennsylvania courts, however, have found it difficult to give up the
pre-Bowers' reasoning. In Palermo Trust' the court, using the ratio-
nale from the early Pennsylvania cases, refused to terminate a trust
when petitioned for such relief by the settlor-sole beneficiary. As au-
thority for denial the court proclaimed that the settlor who creates a
spendthrift trust for himself becomes a "ward of the court" and needs
the court's approval to terminate the trust."7 Undoubtedly the "best
interest" rule was a primary factor in the decision, as the settlor was a
paraplegic who created the irrevocable spendthrift trust with the pro-
ceeds of her railroad accident claim. The court attempted to distin-
guish Palermo from Bowers' by showing that there was a lack of ac-
complishment of purpose in the paraplegic's trust." In contrast, the
mother's trust in Bowers' left no material pupose unaccomplished. It
should be noted, however, that the rule adopted in Bowers' specifically
stated that it would apply "although the purposes of the trust have not
been accomplished. "s9
An attempt was also made to rely on the exception in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 339 that a person under an "incapac-
ity" cannot join in a termination of the trust.'0 This was a misapplica-
tion of the exception as it is clear that § 339 is referring to legal inca-
pacity and not a physical incapacity or a lack of ability to manage
business affairs wisely.
Settlor's Intent
A strong argument in support of the majority view permitting ter-
mination by the settlor-sole beneficiary is found in many courts' insis-
tence in carrying out the settlor's intent. This appears to be any court's
focus in regard to all termination decisions. If the settlor changes his
mind after creating the trust, it is his present intent and not his origi-
nal intent which should be carried out. It is in actuality the settlor's
own property, and he should have the right to determine how he will
enjoy it.'1
On the other hand, the "wisdom versus folly" argument is often
advanced in an attempt to deny termination. According to this view
the settlor created the trust for his protection in a moment of wisdom
"See also rule reaffirmed in Schellentrager v. Trademens Natl Bank & Trust Co., 370
Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952).
"15 Pa. Fiduc. 74 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1963).
"Id. at 83-84.
"ld. at 81-82.
"346 Pa. at 86, 29 A.2d at 520.
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 339.
"G. BOGERT, supra note 12, § 1004.
1981]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
and should not be allowed to destroy that protection in a moment of
folly. This argument overlooks the fact that since the settlor cannot
create a spendthrift trust for himself, he really has not protected him-
self against his folly. The creation of the trust could have been an act
of folly instead of an act of wisdom. Whether folly or wisdom, since
the settlor holds the only beneficial interest in the trust, it should be his
property to manage however he chooses." The question remains who
should determine what is folly and what is wisdom in regard to the
settlor's property. The answer lies either with the judiciary system or
the settlor. In Johnson v. First National Bank of Jackson" the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court explored this question and weighed the implica-
tions of accepting either alternative answer.
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
Johnson v. First National Bank of Jackson was a case of first im-
pression in Mississippi, as the state supreme court had not previously
ruled on the question of whether an irrevocable trust could be revoked
at any time by the settlor who was the sole beneficiary of the trust.
4
Lacking any Mississippi authority directly on point, the court relied on
basic trust law citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 339 (1959) and G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUST-
EES § 1004 (2d ed. 1962). 5 In adherence with majority rule, the court
adopted a general rule that "a settlor who is the sole beneficiary of a
trust may have the trust revoked and set aside even though it was
initially set up in the form of an irrevocable trust.""
The court had to deal with two public policy issues in conflict in
the case. Judicial protection of the individual in regard to financial
folly had to be balanced against freedom of the individual to deal with
his property as he chooses. By allowing revocation of the trust, the
court refused to adopt a parental role as a proper function for any
court in Mississippi. Citing Justice Jackson's dissent in United States v.
Ballard," the court affirmed the right of individuals to deal with their
money as they choose as long as they are under no legal disability." It
was further stated that equity should not attempt to guard persons
from their own folly using societal standards where there was no show-
ing of legal disability."
"Waldron v. Commerce Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. App. 1978).




"322 U.S. 78, 94.
O386 So. 2d at 1115.
"Id.
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Although not an issue in the instant case, it was stressed that John-
son could not have created a spendthrift trust for herself. 00 The court
appeared to take advantage of the opportunity to reaffirm its previous
decision in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Walter E. Heller &
Co."0 ' which held that a spendthrift trust for the grantor's benefit is
void as to creditors.' 2 It was pointed out that even if it had been judi-
cially decided it would be against Ms. Johnson's best interest to revoke
the trust, from a practical standpoint she could still take actions that
would amount to the functional equivalent of revocation. This would
be possible if she borrowed money equal to the corpus of the trust and
gave it to the Church of Scientology. Her creditors could have then
collected her debt from the corpus of the trust.' 8
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in this progressive decision defined a previously
undecided question in Mississippi and moved the state in line with the
prevailing majority view accepted by both trust law authorities and
developed case law concerning the issue. Adoption of the majority rule
could primarily be attributed to the public policy issues involved with
this case. At first glance the issue appeared to be whether the court
would allow Ms. Johnson to squander her money or would protect her
from her own financial irresponsibility. When the facts were examined
more closely, it became apparent that the court really did not have a
choice. Unless she could create a spendthrift trust for herself, which a
previous ruling foreclosed,"" there was no way to keep the corpus from
her creditors. For all practical purposes, nothing would have been ac-
complished by refusing to allow Ms. Johnson to revoke the trust. By
refusing to allow revocation, the court could have indirectly in effect
overruled their decision in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Walter
E. Heller and Co. 105 This would then have allowed an individual to set
up a spendthrift trust for himself in regard to his creditors. This would
not only be contrary to the prevailing majority rule of trust law, but
also against public policy. Individuals should not be permitted to tie
up their property in such a way that they can enjoy it, and still keep
their creditors from reaching it. 0'
A major consideration involved was how much control a court
should be allowed to exert upon an individual's decision making. Pub-
lic policy strongly favors allowing people to do what they wish with
moid.
1'204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
id. at 862.
'0"W6 So. 2d at 1115.
104204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
106ld.
'"IV A. SCOTr, supra note 10, § 156.
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their own property whether it is prudent or foolish. Courts do not re-
form contracts because it appears one party made a bad bargain, but
require the presence of fraud or mutual mistake before they will inter-
fere.' 0t As a corollary, it would be against public policy for the courts
to judicially determine the wisdom or folly of an individual's decision
regarding how he manages his property.
Since a major portion of the record concentrated on the issue of
donations to a church considered by many to be unorthodox, failure to
allow revocation could have also interferred with Ms. Johnson's free-
dom of religion. A first amendment question could have become an
issue which would have required further litigation to resolve.
By not following the minority rule the court avoided having to de-
fine "best interest". If the minority view had been chosen, the lower
courts should have been given some basis for determining "best inter-
est". It would be very difficult to develop definitions or guidelines
without applying societal standards, which the court felt should not be
done.' If the "best interest" rule had been applied, it is conceivable
that this decision would have allowed the Mississippi Supreme Court to
be flooded with cases requiring the determination of "best interest",
not only from trusts but from other areas of law, such as, contracts.1 9
Some problems, however, may appear in the wake of this case. The
question of when a settlor is the sole beneficiary has been the major
issue involved in much of the litigation regarding this type of trust.
Since in the instant case the fact of whether Ms. Johnson was the sole
beneficiary did not appear as an issue, the court did not define when a
settlor will be considered a sole beneficiary. Future litigation in which
this might be an issue would have been avoided had the court also
adopted a definition of settlor-sole beneficiary. Mississippi may choose
to remedy this oversight statutorily as some states have done. However,
since the Doctrine of Worthier Title is still applied in Mississippi as a
rule of construction, this could prevent the settlor-sole beneficiary defi-
nition from becoming the major problem it has been in other states.
With any trust there is always a possibility that unforeseen circum-
stances will make it impossible to fulfill the purposes for which the
trust was originally created. This fact makes trusts an area of law
which requires that flexible equitable principles be applied. In this de-
cision the court has permitted the settlor to exercise a degree of flexi-
bility concerning how she will enjoy her property.
"
0
'Committee on Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, 2 REAL PROP-
ERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 303.
10386 So. 2d at 1115.
' Rebuttal brief for Appellant at 14, Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d
1112 (Miss. 1980).
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The major interest of this case will be for trust officers throughout
the state. Many officers have been giving opinions regarding this issue
based only on general trust law. They now may rely on a Mississippi
decision which clarifies this previously unsettled question of Mississippi
law.
Judith Ford Anspach

